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Introduction
In this paper we design a framework for analyzing and experimenting with algorithms which compute the allocation of combinatorial auctions. The development of such kind of test-suite has been recognized as central to computer science work in the field [11] . Details of motivations behind our work, as well as of the economic background can be found in [1] .
Economic setup
The motivations behind our choices can be found in [1] . Number of items. A reasonable figure for the number of items on sale depends on the economic scenario. We can distinguish between two typical situations: * On leave from IIT-CNR, Pisa, Italy -auctions involving either consumer products or complex and/or expensive industrial items (e.g., spectrum frequencies, intermediate goods); in this case, it is reasonable to assume that the total number of items is of the order of few dozens (a typical value may be around 20);
-auctions involving a long list of heterogeneous products (e.g., a list of spare parts for electric power generating systems); in this case, the number of items does not exceed a few hundreds (here typical figures are 100 to 200).
Value of items.
Although (bundle) items valuations are subjective to the bidder, they can be considered to be drawn from a common distributions across bidders. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that items have a common value (also called market value), and that subjective bidder's valuation is a variation around this value. We therefore adopt this canonical convention, but we specify the distribution for each type of good.
Useful guidelines for setting the item valuations are the following:
-If the average value is small, then it is likely that there are few items with comparatively large value (e.g., a wine bottle of a prestigious vintage), and hence the ratio r between the most and the least expensive items satisfies r 1. In this case, the actual values can be generated using a left skewed distribution, such as the Log-Normal or Pareto distributions.
-On the other hand, when the values of the items are very high (e.g., spectrum frequencies), their market value is likely to be relatively homogeneous, and hence the ratio r is relatively small, say r = 2 or r = 3 (even though larger values are in principle possible); in this case the actual values can be generated using a symmetric distribution, such as the uniform or normal distribution (with reasonably thin tails).
Number of bidders.
Denoting with n/m the ratio of the number of bidders to the number of items, we obtain two clear bounds. In consumer online auctions one can found situations in which a few items are of interest to many potential buyers. A similar situation may be found in businessto-business auctions of industrial components that may be of interest to many industries at a time (e.g., electric components). In this case the upper bound of the n/m ratio is in the order of dozens, with maximum level at, say, 100.
On the other hand, auctions of railroad segments, real estate, or complex industrial components have typically many items and few buyers. Here the ratio n/m lies below 1-2, with lower bound close to zero.
Another consideration regards the absolute number of bidders, which is in general larger for consumers than for corporate buyers. Absolute numbers not exceeding 10000 in the former case, and not exceeding 100 in the latter are realistic.
Bidder budget. This is also called the size of the potential buyer. In case of individuals, the size is the buyer's wealth, while for a corporate agent is total net assets. In the following, we will always assume that the total value of the bids presented by any bidder does not exceed their budget. It should be observed that the bidder budget plays a significant role only when the ratio of the (average) bidder size to the (average) item market value, denoted S/V , is relatively small. Suppose S/V = 10; then, the bidders invest a significant amount of their money in the bids (in general, above 10% of her size), and the price offered for each bundle of items must be carefully evaluated in order not to exceed the budget. Conversely, if S/V is very large (say, 10000), as it could be the case when the auctioned items have very small values (e.g., stickers), we might think of bidders with unlimited budget, and budget considerations do not apply. A last remark regards the distribution of the bidder sizes. In general, we can assume that this distribution is left skewed, both for individual income and firm size. In fact, it is a widely accepted fact that wealth is asymmetrically distributed.
Bidder valuation. We model the "subjective" factors that affect the valuation made by each bidder in term of probabilistic perturbations; that is, a bidder valuation for a given bundle is given by a probabilistic perturbation of the sum of the market values of the items included in that bundle. The probabilistic distribution chosen is normal, with mean the sum of the market value and very small deviation. Superadditivity (or even sub-additivity) can be also modeled depending on the particular types of goods (see Section 3). We observe, however, that complementarities are likely to occur on bundle composed by few items (due to bidders' cognitive limitations), and that the "added value" of a complementarity is usually a fraction (hardly exceeding 10%) of the sum of the single item market values.
We conclude this section by summarizing the steps we will follow to generate realistic set of bids. ing care not to exceed the budget (in case that budget limitation applies to the economic setup). The price offered for every (bundle) bid is generated using the methodology described above.
Guidelines for

A case study
The abstract procedure described at the end of the previous section must be made precise not only by assigning specific values to the economic parameters, but also by clearly defining the procedure used to generate the actual items on sale and the bids. In turn, this will depend on the specific setting and the nature of the goods. In this section we outline the general ideas underlining the item and bid generation process in case the goods can be regarded as geometric elements in a Euclidean space. For the case study of Section 3.1, the items will be rectangles.
We first assign a (market) value to the goods on sale. For each item, we compute it by combining two figures: (1) a measure of the geometric object itself and (2) a quantity related to the (average) distance of the object from a set of "strategic points", that we will refer to as the centers of interest.
We then define, for each potential buyer, the set of items she is interested in. What we actually do is to compute a different ranking of the items for each bidder. To do this, we use essentially the same ideas adopted for assigning the market values to the items, but using only some (randomly picked) centers of interest, which we regard as strategic to her. We stress that the computed distances from the subset of centers of interest selected are used only to rank the items, and not to assign values to them. Depending on the budget, we now proceed to form the actual (sunflower 1 ) bids. A fraction of the budget will go to the core and the rest to the petals. The goal is to select set of items that are close together in some sense. For instance, in the real estate scenario, bidders may try to form bids in which the whole surface (core plus any petal) is as regular as possible. Once the bundles have been selected, the offered price is determined according to the rules given in Section 2.
In the next subsection we specialize the high level bid generation scheme described above to the generation of realistic test sets in the real estate setting. Another case study (allocation of the rights to use railroad tracks) can be found in [1] . During the generation of the test set, we will introduce a number of technical parameters that can be used to fine tune the experiments. When we describe any experimental result, we clearly indicate the parameter values for which it holds.
Real estate auctions
Real estate sales represent a realistic case study for CAs (see [11, 17] ), and one where the items auctioned can be regarded as geometric objects. We can thus apply both the economic guidelines of Section 2 and the structural considerations at the beginning of this section.
Real Estate map generation. We use a different technique with respect to that used in the proximity in space distribution of [11] . We start with an empty rectangular region R, which represents the overall auctioned land. Then, we subdivide it iteratively into smaller lots. The process is driven by two size parameters, M and µ, and a probability of further splitting p. The detailed generation algorithm is the following. 1 For a definition of sunflower bid, see [1] .
Algorithm Lots generation 1. Let m be the number of desired lots (the items on sale). 2. Let R = R 0 denote the whole auctioned area (a square region of unit side). 3. Mark R 0 as unvisited. 4 . Repeat (a) Let R i be an unvisited lot.
(b) If both sides of R i are shorter than µ, mark R i as visited;
(c) if both sides of R i are larger than M , split R i into R j and R k and mark them as unvisited;
(d) otherwise, split R i (as in 4c) with probability p.
(e) If the number of lots is m then report SUCCESS and STOP. until there are unvisited lots.
Report FAILURE
In case R i must be subdivided (steps 4c and 4d), we first select one of its sides, along which R i will be cut. If one of the sides is smaller than µ, then we select the other side. Otherwise, we randomly choose one of the two sides. The selected side is cut at a random point, but with the constraint that the two resulting rectangles have sides of length at least µ/2. By appropriately choosing parameters M, µ, and p we can control the average number of lots generated and some requested output parameters (e.g., how much they differ in shape and area). An example of map generated according to this procedure is shown in Figure 1 , which is characterized by the following normalized parameters: M = 0.34, µ = 0.18, and p = 0.5. A sunflower bid is also shown in Figure 1 , which is formed by a core (lots labeled C) and three disjoint petals (lots labeled 1 to 3).
We now discuss in details the parameters defined in Section 2.
Number of items and number of bidders. We consider real estate lots as high-value items for consumer (see Section 2). Therefore, we assume that m ≤ 100 and fix n/m ≤ 2.
Value of items. Our item (market) value generation technique is driven by the following simple observations:
-the value of a lot is proportional to its area; -lots that are close to centers of interest (e.g., tourist spots, business centers, and so on) are more valuable.
In order to generate the item values, we first randomly and uniformly distribute c centers of interest (points in the plane) in R. For each center of interest c i , we randomly generate two numbers k i and s i , which represent the relative strength of c i and how fast the interest generated by c i decreases with the distance. More specifically, given a lot R j on sale, the "added value" generated by c i on R j is computed as:
where (x i , y i ) are the coordinates of the point c i . The value of the real estate piece R j is defined as the sum of the values generated by all the centers of interest. Formally:
Size of bidders. We generate the size of each bidder at random starting from Log-Normal deviates. We assume that the wealthiest bidder has enough budget to buy a fraction φ of all the goods on sale. To generate a budget b i for bidder B i we first draw a random number r i from the Log-Normal distribution with parameters µ = 1 and σ = 0.4 and scale the result so that the probability that it exceeds φ is negligible. Then, we assign to bidder i the budget
where λ φ is the scaling factor, and t c is the sum of the values of all the lots on sale. In the experiments reported in the next section, we set λ φ = 20.
Bid generation. We assume that the goal of each bidder is the acquisition of a certain amount of area as closest as possible to one of her centers of interest. Clearly, given her budget b i , bidder B i can buy a fraction b i /t c of all the area on sale, on the average. Since different lots will have different values, B i may not be able to satisfy her wishes (in this case, the bidder will not send any offer). To limit this effect, we reduce the requirement of area by a factor 1 + u i , where u i is a value drawn uniformly at random from [0, ], for some small parameter . In the experiments reported in the next section, we set = 0.2.
Having set the goals, the last step is the actual generation of the bids, which will have the sunflower structure. There is still the problem of "modeling" the different interests (i.e., different buyers are interested in different lots) and valuations (i.e., the subjective perception of the market values) of the bidders. We are aware that any mathematical solution to this problem is likely not to be adequate. We propose the following strategy. We have already identified c centers of interest, and used them to compute the (market) value of items. Now we use the centers of interest also to form the bidder's lot preferences. More precisely, for each sunflower she will submit, a bidder select (at random) a subset of the c centers of interest and compute, as in (1), a value for each lot on sale. She then uses this value to rank the pieces of land; the sorted (from the most to the less valuable) list will define her preferences. Once the ranking has been generated, the private item values are discarded. In fact, in accordance with the guidelines of Section 2, the bidder valuation function is based on the market value of the items, and is generated as follows. First, the valuation of each single item is determined as a uniform random perturbation of the market value. This models the fact that, due to cognitive limitations, the subjective perception of a market value can be different from its "real" value. For example, a big company can hire a team of experts to precisely estimate the market value of an item; conversely, a private bidder who wants to buy a piece of land to build her house has in general only a rough idea of its real market value. Once the valuations for single items have been defined, the valuation of a bundle bid is generated as the sum of the valuations of its components, plus a sub-additive or super-additive term that depends on the regularity of the bid area (see details below).
To summarize, each sunflower bid is generated according to the procedure outlined below.
Algorithm Bid generation for real estate auctions
Selects the best ranked item not yet considered; if its
rank is below a certain threshold, this bid generation fails. 2. Choose a number of lots adjacent to the one selected in 1, until a fraction f c of the desired area A is reached. These will form the core of the sunflower. 3. Build 2 up to 4 disjoint petals around the core, until the desired area (core plus a petal) is reached. 4. For each (core,petal) pair, compute the price to be offered as the sum of the perturbed marked values 2 .
5. If the price to be offered exceeds the budget, repeat step 3. If this repeatedly fails, backtrack to step 1.
As a final remark, we observe that the lots that will form the sunflower core are selected in a such way that the shape of the core is as regular as possible.
Experimental results
We have performed a significant number of experiments, where the inputs to the allocation algorithms have been Table 2 . LPSOLVE and ALPH running times, and ALPH accuracy, in the real estate scenario with 100 items on sale and different number of bidders. Running times are expressed in seconds.
computed according to the scheme described in the previous sections. The goal of these experiments was two-fold:
-to investigate how existing optimal and approximate winner determination algorithms perform on realistic data sets. Performance is measured in terms of execution time and, in case of approximate algorithms, in terms of accuracy of the solution provided;
-to investigate the auction coverage problem, i.e., the number of unallocated items in the winning combination, in two realistic settings.
For the experiments we have used a Linux machine with a 1.4Ghz Athlon processor and 1Gb of RAM.
Winner determination algorithm performance. Regarding the first issue, we have considered the ALPH approximate algorithm proposed by Zurel and Nisan in [25] , whose source code is available on the web (http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/∼zurel). This algorithm is known to perform extremely well, both in term of speed and accuracy, on large size random instances and on the instances of [11] ; thus, it is of great interest to test it against more realistic benchmarks. The performance of ALPH (expressed in terms of both accuracy of the solution and running time) has been compared to that of an optimal winner determination algorithm, namely the freely available Linux package LPSOLVE. Our current focus is more on algorithm accuracy than speed; for this reason, we have not yet compared the performance of ALPH with that of other existing packages, like CPLEX or the algorithm of [22] . First we have considered the real estate scenario. We have generated several data sets, with m, the number of items, which in this case are real estate pieces, equal to 50 and 100, and n, the number of bidders, ranging from 10 to 100. Going far beyond these figures seems unrealistic for this case study. For each combination of n and m, we have generated 100 different data sets, where every bidder presents exactly one sunflower bid, and executed both LP-SOLVE and ALPH on each data set.
The results of our experiments are reported in Tables 1  and 2 . ALPH turned out to be very fast for every combination of n and m: even in the most critical scenario (n = m = 100), the worst-case ALPH running time was 0.04 seconds. The average ALPH accuracy was always above 98.9%. However, the worst-case accuracy could be an issue: when the number of bidders is above 10, ALPH generates less than 92% of the maximum possible revenue is some cases. We remark that worst-case accuracy is an important parameter from the auctioneer's point of view. In fact, the seller is interested in having a minimum guarantee on the auction efficiency.
LPSOLVE running time, although relatively high for the largest problem instances, never exceeded a reasonable bound: when n = m = 100, the worst-case running time was 117.9 seconds, with an average of only 7.42 seconds. Hence, we can conclude that in our real estate scenario computational efficiency should not be an issue, since the optimal solution can be calculated in a reasonable time.
We have then considered the railroad scenario, which is described in [1] . We have generated several data sets, with m, the number of items, which in this case are railroad tracks, ranging from 50 to 200, and n, the number of bidders, ranging from 5 to 20. In this scenario, going beyond the number of 20 bidders seems unrealistic. For each combination of n and m, we have generated 100 different data sets, where every bidder presents exactly one sunflower bid, and executed both LPSOLVE and ALPH on each data set. The results of our experiments for 50 and 200 items are reported in Tables 3 and 4 . Also in this case ALPH turned out to be very fast for every combination of n and m: in the most critical instances (n = 20 and m = 200), the worstcase ALPH running time was 0.23 seconds. Compared to the real estate case study, the average ALPH accuracy was slightly higher (always above 99.5%). However, the worstcase accuracy was more critical for certain combinations of n and m. For example, when n = 20 and m = 200, ALPH generates less than 85% of the maximum possible revenue is some cases.
For what concerns the running time of LPSOLVE, we have observed that, also in this setting, it never exceeds a reasonable bound: when n = 20 and m = 200, the worstcase running time was 227 seconds, with an average of only 6.3 seconds. Hence, also in the railroad setting computational efficiency should not be an issue.
Overall, the results of the first set of experiments have shown that computational efficiency should not be an issue in both the real estate and the railroad setting, since the optimal solution can be calculated in a reasonable time. The ALPH approximate algorithm, although very fast and accurate on the average, can occasionally generate less than 85% of the maximum possible revenue, which could be a major problem in real auctions.
Auction coverage. In the second set of experiments, we evaluated the auction coverage, which, we recall, is defined as the percentage of items sold. We remark that, if items were to be auctioned sequentially, the coverage would be very close to 100%. This means that a CA that allocates only, say, 50% of the items is very likely to generate less revenue than the corresponding sequential auction (which is also much easier to manage). So, the evaluation of auction coverage is fundamental to estimate the expected economic efficiency of a CA.
As in the previous set of experiments, we have considered both the real estate and the railroad settings. In the real estate scenario, we have generated data sets with 50 and 100 items, and number of bidders ranging from 5 to 100 in the first case, and from 10 to 200 in the second case. In the railroad track setting, we have generated data sets with 50 and 100 items, and number of bidders ranging from 5 to 20 when m = 50, and from 10 to 40 when m = 100. In both scenarios, we have considered a further parameter in the data generation phase, i.e., the number of sunflower per bidder presented, which varies from 1 to 8. We remark that sunflowers presented by a single bidder are XORed, i.e., any bidder can win at most one sunflower. In order to keep the simulation time reasonable, we have used the fast ALPH allocation algorithm, which generates a nearly optimal (in most cases) solution. The results of our experiments are reported in Tables 5 and 6 for the real estate setting, and in Tables 7 and 8 for the railroad setting. As in the previous section, results are averaged over 100 experiments.
In the case of real estate, the coverage is proportional to the n/m ratio. Moreover, given any value of n/m, coverage increases with the number of sunflowers per bidder presented. However, unless the number of bidders is very low (5-10), allowing more than 5 sunflowers per bidder provides little benefit to the auction coverage. When n/m is far below 1 (e.g., 0.1), a considerable percentage of items remains unsold (up to 54% when m = 50, n = 5 and every bidder bids on a single sunflower), even when the number of sunflowers per bidder is 8. Hence, in these cases multiround CAs should be used to increase efficiency. When the ratio n/m is 1 and above, the auction coverage is in general good (above 90% erage in a single CA round seems to be very difficult: our results clearly show a coverage convergence phenomenon, which is around 98% when m = 50 and around 95% when m = 100. Coverage resulted much more critical in the railroad tracks case study (see Tables 7 and 8 ): even in the more favorable scenario (n = 20, m = 50, and 8 sunflowers per bidder), almost 20% of the items remain unsold.
Overall, the results of our experiments have shown that coverage is an issue, especially in the railroad setting, where it can be as low as 31%, and it is only 81% in the most favorable scenario. Thus, the results of our experiments suggest that in some settings (e.g., railroad track auctions), multiround CAs are the only viable tool to improve the auction efficiency.
Further work
This paper is a preliminary step towards the development of a test suite for the analysis of allocation algorithm against economically sound benchmarks. Much work has still to be done. As observed in [1] , one obvious direction is to include bidding equilibrium into the instance generator. As for the auction coverage, it would be interesting to evaluate how this phenomenon is affected by the use of approximation algorithms (i.e., to see whether coverage increases as revenue approaches optimality). Also, the analysis of more case studies will lead to further insights into the problem. Table 8 . Auction coverage (expressed as percentage of item sold) in the railroad scenario with 100 tracks on sale and different number of bidders.
